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ATTORNEYS' FEES

Attorneys' Fees Are Costly, But Are They a Recoverable
Cost ofEnvironmental Cleanup Under Superfund?
by Robert H. Abrams

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
("CERCLA") for cleaning up the Landfill. The United States
Air Force was one of the parties uncovered by Key Tronic's
efforts. Concurrently, Key Tronic retained legal counsel and a
consultant to work with the United States Environmental
(Docket No. 93-376)
Protection Agency (the "EPA") and Washington state officials in developing a remedial plan for the Landfill and reducArgument Date: March 29, 1994
ing it to a consent decree. That decree was entered, setting
From: The Ninth Circuit
forth the agreed-upon remedy and extinguishing Key
Tronic's further liability in exchange for a sizeable payment
ISSUE
of $4.2 million.
Do Sections 107(a) and 101(25) of the Comprehensive
With other PRPs identified at the Landfill, the EPA began
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
negotiations with them regarding settlement of their liability.
popularly known as Superfund,
The Air Force agreed to pay the EPA
$1.45 million to extinguish its liabilauthorize a private party who cleans
up environmental contamination to
ity for implementing the remedy
recover its attorneys' fees as part of
selected in the consent decree.
he Federal Comprehensive
the costs of cleanup?
Key Tronic, in the meantime,
Environmental Response,
sought to shift its loss at the Landfill
Compensation, and Liability
FACTS
to the other PRPs, including the Air
Act, better known as Superfund, encourThe Colbert Landfill (the
Force. In October 1989, Key Tronic
ages private parties to clean up sites of
"Landfill"), located in eastern
filed suit against the Air Force, seekenvironmental contamination. Among
Washington State, is operated by
ing awards for two separate items.
the incentives given to those parties is a
Spokane County, Washington.
First, Key Tronic sued for the $1.2
right to sue other potentially responsible
During the 1970s, Key Tronic
million it spent before its settlement
parties for cleanup costs, including the
Corporation (Key Tronic) along with
with the EPA. This type of action is
cost of "enforcement activities" associseveral other entities, including the
usually referred to as "private cost
ated with cleanup. At issue in Key
United States Air Force, disposed of
recovery" and is authorized by
Tronic is whether a party that took
liquid chemicals at the Landfill. In
Section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA.
immediate steps to clean up a contami1980, state testing of nearby drinking
Second, Key Tronic sought to recovnated site can recover attorneys' fees
water wells found significant contaer some or all of the $4.2 million it
and investigative costs, as well as its
mination that was traced to hazardous
had paid to the EPA. This type of
more conventional cleanup costs, from
materials leaking from the Landfill.
action is usually referred to as "conother responsible parties.
Together with Spokane County, Key
tribution" and is authorized by
Tronic retained consultants and
Section 113(f) ofCERCLA. Because
incurred other costs in taking meathe Air Force had settled separately
sures to provide alternate water supplies and begin the process
with the EPA and obtained "contribution protection" as
of site remediation.
authorized by CERCLA, that portion of Key Tronic's suit was
Key Tronic also took steps to identify other potentially
dismissed early on.
responsible parties ("PRPs"); that is, to identify additional
Turning to Key Tronic's $1.2 million cost recovery claim,
parties who are liable under the Comprehensive
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington ruled that, as a matter of law, Key Tronic was
entitled to recover. The Air Force and Key Tronic then negoRobert Abrams is professor of law at Wayne State University
tiated an agreement quantifying the liability of the Air Force.
School ofLaw, 468 West Ferry Mall, Detroit, M148202, (313)
This agreement had two components: $185,000 to reimburse
577-3930, and co-author of a leading environmental law
Key Tronic for costs incurred for well contamination studies
casebook, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
and provision of alternate water supplies to affected well
AND SOCIETY.
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users, and $155,000 for (1) prelitigation costs and attorneys'
fees incurred identifying additional PRPs, (2) prelitigation
costs and attorneys' fees incurred working on the consent
decree, (3) attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting the cost
recovery action, and (4) prejudgment interest on the expected
claims.
The district court ruled in favor of Key Tronic, holding that
all of the items were recoverable in a CERCLA cost recovery
action. 766 F.Supp 865 (E.D. Wash. 1991). The Air Force
appealed the holding only insofar as it related to prelitigation
costs and attorneys' fees, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed. 984 F.2d 1025 (1993).
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
Above all else this is a case of statutory interpretation with
the key question being whether CERCLA Section 107 authorizes an award of attorneys' fees and other litigation-related
expenses as part of recoverable response costs. The longestablished American Rule is that, win or lose, each side bears
its own attorneys' fees. There are exceptions to the rule, some
grounded in equity and others created by statute. Here,
CERCLA is claimed as the source of a statutory exception in
cost recovery actions because Section 101(25) defines recoverable response costs to include the costs of "enforcement
activity."
The legal issue is a close one that has divided the federal
circuit courts. In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit ruled
against the recoverability of fees and litigation costs in private
party actions. In Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir.
1993), and General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation
Systems, Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits took the opposite view. The Tenth Circuit, in
FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 988 F.2d 842 (lOth Cir.
1993), has adopted an intermediate view that would allow
some of the attorneys' fees contested in this case to be recovered. There are also district court decisions on both sides of
the issue. That various courts have differed on the issue is not
surprising as there are well-reasoned legal arguments on both
sides.
Key Tronic stresses CERCLA policy favoring cost spreading among PRPs and the role of private cost recovery actions
in achieving that goal. To encourage private parties to step
forward and help solve the problems at Superfund sites,
Congress established the private cost recovery action so that
the active private parties could recoup a fair portion of their
expenditures from fellow PRPs. Denying recovery would
undermine the incentive established by Congress by making
the transaction costs of cost recovery a deadweight loss for
cooperative parties who acted to start immediate site cleanup.
Key Tronic also makes an argument based on the amended
text of the statute. In particular, the 1986 Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act added language to
CERCLA Section 101(25) that defined "response" (as in the
phrase "response costs") to "include enforcement activities
related thereto." Key Tronic, relying on that added language,
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claims that beyond its original efforts at the Landfill, its
efforts at identifying PRPs, its efforts at working out a remedial design, and the legal and consulting costs associated with
those efforts are all part of its response costs because they are
within the scope of the response itself, or are associated
enforcement activities.
The Air Force seeks to have the Ninth Circuit affirmed by
arguing that cost shifting is a narrow exception to the
American Rule and requires explicit statutory authorization,
not merely convenient policy arguments. Were that not the
case, the exceptions would begin to swallow the rule. In virtually all remedial statutes that grant a right of recovery to an
injured party, a policy argument favoring cost shifting as furthering legislative intent is available. As to the textual argument made in this case, the Air Force counters that Congress
knows how to draft explicit fee-shifting language and has
done so in several other parts of Superfund but not in this part.
Consistent with its straightforward appearance, this is a
case of modest significance. Even though the dollar amounts
for cost recovery attorneys' fees in any given case can be
large, the role of attorneys' fees in the mix of incentives to
cooperate may not that great. There are other incentives to
cooperate, not the least of which are the ability to influence
the remedy selected and controlling the cost of implementing
the agreed-upon remedy. Moreover, whatever the decision in
the case, it need not do violence to Congress' desires regarding private cost recovery actions. The issue is one of statutory
interpretation. If Congress is displeased with the result
reached by the Supreme Court, Congress can amend the
statute.
ARGUMENTS
For Key Tronic Corporation (Counsel of Record: James R.
Moore; Perkins Coie, 1201 Third Avenue, Seattle, WA 981013099; (206) 583-8888):
1. CERCLA's policy of encouraging private party initiative
warrants the recovery of attorneys' fees and the other costs
of response in Section 107 cost recovery actions.
2. CERCLA Section 101(25), when it defines "response" to
include "enforcement activities related thereto," authorizes
recovery of attorneys' fees in Section 107 cost recovery
actions.
For the United States (Counsel ofRecord: Drew S. Days, lll,
Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC
20530; (202) 514-2217):
I. The well-established American Rule is that parties must
bear their own attorneys' fees and that exceptions to the
rule are rare.
2. Congressional authorization of attorneys' fee shifting,
when it is done, is accomplished through explicit terms
unlike those appearing in CERCLA Section 101(25).
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